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Recent evidence suggests that a state of good mental health is associated with biased
processing of information that supports a positively skewed view of the future. Depression,
on the other hand, is associated with unbiased processing of such information. Here,
we use brain imaging in conjunction with a belief update task administered to clinically
depressed patients and healthy controls to characterize brain activity that supports unbiased
belief updating in clinically depressed individuals. Our results reveal that unbiased belief
updating in depression ismediated by strong neural coding of estimation errors in response
to both good news (in left inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral superior frontal gyrus) and bad
news (in right inferior parietal lobule and right inferior frontal gyrus) regarding the future.
In contrast, intact mental health was linked to a relatively attenuated neural coding of bad
news about the future.These ﬁndings identify a neural substrate mediating the breakdown
of biased updating in major depression disorder, which may be essential for mental health.
Keywords: depression, decision making, belief updating, optimism, biased processing
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to traditional psychological theories that maintain that
good mental health is sub-served by accurate beliefs in rela-
tion to reality (Maslow, 1950; Jahoda, 1958; Erikson, 1963), a
large body of literature (Allport, 1955; Taylor and Brown, 1988)
suggest biases may promote adaptive functioning. In particular,
“positive illusions” (including overly positive evaluation of the
self, unrealistic optimism and an exaggerated sense of control)
are argued to enhance mental health by encouraging productiv-
ity, social interaction, subjective happiness and physical health
(Taylor et al., 2003; McKay and Dennett, 2010); but see Compton
(1992), Colvin and Block (1994). In healthy individuals, positive
illusions are especially apparent under circumstances of adversity
(Taylor and Armor, 1996) which may enhance resiliency to stress-
ful life events. By contrast, moderately depressed individuals have
been reported to display a less positive, but relatively unbiased,
view of the self (Coyne and Gotlib, 1983), the future (Strunk and
Adler, 2009), and sense of control (Alloy and Abramson, 1979)
– dubbed “depressive realism” [but see Allan et al. (2007) and
Moore and Fresco (2007)]. Importantly, however, severely
depressed individuals often show negative biases in these
domains (Roiser et al., 2012) which can predict fatal outcomes
(Oquendo et al., 2004).
Positive biases are generated in healthy individuals because
while people incorporate desirable information into existing
beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule (Eil and Rao, 2011), for
undesirable information they show an aversion to incorporate
new information (Köszegi, 2006) and discount its impact (Eil
and Rao, 2011). We recently found that depressed patients lack
the positive skewed belief updating bias seen in healthy con-
trols when they update their expectations about the future (Korn
et al., 2013). These ﬁndings raise an intriguing question as to
what differs in depression in terms of underlying neural sub-
strates that support an unbiased belief formation about the
future.
We have previously demonstrated that, in healthy participants,
biased updating in response to positive and negative news is medi-
ated by a relatively weak correlation between brain activity and
negative estimation errors, but intact coding of positive estima-
tion errors (Sharot et al., 2011). Here, utilizing the belief updating
task in combination with functional brain imaging we ask whether
depression is associated with neural responses that are likely to
support a more unbiased integration of information about the
future
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty individuals aged 18–65 participated in the study (half
unmedicated depressed patients and half healthy controls).
Depressed participants were identiﬁed through Camden and
Islington Foundation Trust Psychological Treatment Services or
recruited by advertisement. Healthy controls were recruited from
UCL psychology subject pool and matched to depressed par-
ticipants for age, gender, and level of education. One control
participant was subsequently excluded from the analysis due to
a high score on the Beck Depression Inventory (>10). None of
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the participants had taken antidepressant medication for at least
6 weeks prior to undertaking the study due to a variety of personal
choices unrelated to the study itself. No participants had a period
of substance or alcohol abuse in the 6 months prior to undertaking
the study. See Table 1 for demographic and clinical information.
Before the study, all participants were assessed for psychiatric
disorders by a trained researcher using the Mini International
Neuropsychiatric Inventory (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). Train-
ing involved the researcher observing six separate MINI interviews
and then being observed carrying out four MINI interviews with
detailed feedback provided after each interview. The MINI con-
ﬁrmed that depressed participants had experienced depressive
episodes in the past and met criteria for a major depressive episode
at the time of undertaking the study. For controls, the MINI
conﬁrmed that participants had not experienced any depressive
episodes during their lifetime. The MINI was also used to verify
that participants in both groups had no other past or present psy-
chiatric conditions, other than anxiety disorders in the depressed
participants. Participants that did not conform to any of the above
were not invited to participate in the study further. All partici-
pants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961)
controls mean = 2.21 (range: 0–9), MDD mean = 25.80 (range
13–44). Themajority of depressed participantsweremildly (n= 5)
or moderately (n = 7) depressed, with a minority (n = 3) severely
depressed.
All participants gave informed consent and were paid for their
participation. The study was approved by the London Queen
Square Research Ethics Committee.
LIFE EVENTS
Eighty short descriptions of negative life events (e.g., passenger
in a car accident, home burglary – see Sharot et al., 2011) were
presented in random order. For each adverse event the average
probability of that event occurring at least once to a person liv-
ing in the same socio-cultural environment as the participants
Table 1 | Demographic and clinical information of participants.
Controls MDD patients
N (Male) 14 (9) 15 (9)
Age1 30.36 (8.35) 31.47 (9.16)
Level of education*2 2.64 (0.81) 2.60 (0.88)
BDI3 2.21 (2.75) 25.80 (9.97)
N with history of alcohol/substance abuse 0 (0%) 4 (26%)
N receiving psychotherapy 0 (0%) 2 (13%)
Age of onset of ﬁrst depressive episode 0 (0%) 18.64 (7.01)
N with at least two depressive episodes 0 (0%) 14 (93%)
N previously attempting suicide 0 (0%) 2 (13%)
Figures represent mean (SD) unless stated otherwise.
*Coded as follows: (1) High School; (2) Bachelors Degree; (3) Masters Degree;
(4) Ph.D.
1Independent sample t-test: t(27) = 0.34 ( >0.73).
2Independent sample t-test: t(27) = −0.13 ( >0.89).
3Independent sample t-test: t(27) = 8.71 ( <0.05).
was determined from online resources (Ofﬁce for National Statis-
tics, Eurostat, PubMed). Very rare, or very common, events were
not included; all events probabilities lay between 10 and 70%. To
ensure that the range of possible overestimation was equal to the
range of possible underestimation, participants were told that the
range of probabilities lay between 3 and 77%.
PROCEDURE
The procedure was identical to our previous study (Sharot et al.,
2011), and we summarize it below. Participants went through
three practice trials. The session began with a short structural
scan, followed by four functional runs consisting of 40 trials each
(all 80 events were presented twice). Finally, an additional longer
structural scan was performed.
BEHAVIORAL TASK
The paradigm was adapted from our previous studies (Sharot
et al., 2011, 2012a,b; Chowdhury et al., 2013; Korn et al., 2013;
Moutsiana et al., 2013) and depicted in Figure 1. On each trial
a life event was presented on screen for 4 s. Participants were
instructed to think of that event happening to them in the future.
After 4 s, participants were to respond in the following manner: in
half of the runs (either runs 1 and 2 or runs 3 and 4, counterbal-
anced across participants), the words “Estimation of happening?”
appeared on screen and participants entered their estimated like-
lihood of the event happening to them in the future. In the other
two runs, the words “Estimation of NOT happening?” appeared
on screen and participants entered their estimated likelihood of
the event not happening to them in the future. We framed estima-
tions in these two ways so that (1) differential processing of good
news and bad news (that is, overestimation and underestimation
of the likelihood of an event) could not be attributed to differential
processing of high and low numbers (2) half the life events would
be framed as negative (getting robbed) and half positive (never
getting robbed), yet the information received in both cases could
be good (less likely to get robbed, more likely never to get robbed)
or bad (more likely to get robbed, less likely never to get robbed). If
participants had already experienced an event in their lifetime they
were instructed to estimate the likelihood of that event happening
(or not happening) to them again in the future.
Participants had up to 6 s to respond using a button box with
four buttons in each hand. Each button corresponded to one digit.
The digits 0 through 7 could be used to enter the estimated likeli-
hoods in the“happen”estimation anddigits 2 through 9 in the“not
happen” estimation. If the participant failed to respond, then that
trial was excluded from all subsequent analyses (mean trials with
no response = 1.38, SD = 2.83). A ﬁxation cross then appeared
for 1–5 s (jittered). Next, the event description appeared again for
2 s, together with the average probability of that event to occur
(or not occur, depending on “happen” or “not happen” sessions).
Finally, a ﬁxation cross appeared for 1–3 s (jittered).
We were interested in how participants altered their beliefs in
response to the information given. Thus, participants estimated
each event twice in two consecutive sessions (before and after they
received information). One list of 40 life events (counterbalanced)
was presented during scan 1 and then again during scan 2. The
other list was presented during scan 3 and then again during scan 4.
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FIGURE 1 | Paradigm. (A) On each trial participants were presented
with a short description of one of 80 adverse events and asked to
estimate how likely this event was to occur to them. They were then
presented with the average probability of that event occurring to a
person living in the same sociocultural environment. The second session
was the same as the ﬁrst. For each event an update term was
calculated as the difference between the participant’s ﬁrst and second
estimations. Examples of trials for which the participant’s estimate
was (B) higher or (C) lower than the average probability. Here, for
illustration purposes only, the blue and red frames denote the
participant’s response (either an overestimation or underestimation,
respectively) and the blue and red ﬁlled boxes denote information
that calls for an adjustment in a (B) desirable (good news) or
(C) undesirable (bad news) direction.
To test participants’ memory for the information presented
we asked participants, after the scanning sessions, to provide the
actual probability previously presented of each event. Participants
then rated all life events on: vividness (“How vividly could you
imagine this event?” From 1 = not vivid to 6 = very vivid); famil-
iarity (“Regardless if this event has happened to you before, how
familiar do you feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies and so
on?” From 1 = not at all familiar to 6 very familiar); prior experi-
ence (“Has this event happened to you before?” From 1 = never to
6 = very often); arousal (“When you imagine this event happening
to you how emotionally arousing is the image in yourmind?”From
1 = not arousing at all to 6 = very arousing) and negativity (“How
negative would this event be for you?” From 1 = not negative at
all to 6 = very negative).
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
Behavioral analysis was conducted as described previously (Sharot
et al., 2011, 2012a,b; Chowdhury et al., 2013; Korn et al., 2013;
Moutsiana et al., 2013) using IBM SPSS statistics (version 19).
All actual (statistical) and estimated percentages in the “not hap-
pen” sessions were transformed into the corresponding numbers
of the “happen” sessions by subtracting the respective number
from 100. For each participant, trials were classiﬁed according to
whether the participant initially overestimated or underestimated
the probability of the life event relative to the average probabil-
ity presented. Speciﬁcally, if their initial estimate was lower than
the average presented, this information would be categorized as
“bad news.” If their initial estimate was higher than the aver-
age presented, this information would be categorized as “good
news.” Trials in which the initial estimate was equal to the average
presented were excluded from subsequent analyses (mean = 1.83
trials, SD = 1.65) as these could not be categorized into either
condition.
For each event in each session, an estimation error term was
calculated as the absolute difference between the participant’s
estimate and the corresponding statistical probability presented:
Estimation Error = | First Estimate – Probability Presented |
Update was calculated as follows:
Update (Good News) = First Estimate – Second Estimate
Update (Bad News) = Second Estimate – First Estimate
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Thus, positive updates indicate a change toward the proba-
bility presented and negative updates a change away from the
probability presented. Average update scores were then entered
into a two (valence: good/bad) by two (group: MDD/Control)
repeated-measures ANOVA.
To explore the relationship between estimation errors and
update, for each participant, two linear regressions were con-
ducted entering estimation errors as independent measures and
updates as dependent measures – one for trials in which partici-
pants received good news and one for trials in which participants
received bad news. Thus, we deﬁned two learning scores for each
participant (one for good and one for bad news) as the regression
coefﬁcients corresponding to the slope in each regression.
Memory errors were calculated as the absolute difference
between the probability previously presented and the participants’
recollection of that statistic:
Memory Error = | Actual Probability Presented – Recollection of
Probability Presented |
Average memory error scores for good news and bad news were
calculated for each participant and entered into a two (valence:
good/bad) by two (group: MDD/Control) repeated-measures
ANOVA.ANOVAswere also performed on scores of all other scales
(negativity, emotional arousal, vividness, familiarity, past experi-
ence) as well as on other task measures (initial estimates, reaction
times, estimation errors, number of trials).
MRI SCANNING
Scanning was performed at the Wellcome Trust Center for
Neuroimaging at UCL using a 3T Siemens Allegra scanner
with a Siemens head coil. Functional images were acquired
as echo-planar (EPI) T2∗-weighted images. Time of repetition
(TR) = 2.73 s, time of echo (TE) = 30 ms, ﬂip angle (FA) = 90,
matrix = 64 × 64, ﬁeld of view (FOV) = 192 mm, slice thick-
ness = 2 mm. A total of 42 axial slices (−30◦tilt) were sampled for
whole brain coverage, in-plane resolution = 3 × 3 mm.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5,Wellcome Trust Center for
Neuroimaging1) was used for fMRI data analysis. After discarding
the ﬁrst six dummy volumes, images were realigned to the seventh
volume, unwarped, normalized to a standard EPI template based
on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain,
resampled to 2mm× 2mm× 2mmvoxels and spatially smoothed
with an isotropic 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian
kernel. Low frequency artifacts were removed using a 1/128 Hz
high-pass ﬁlter and temporal autocorrelation intrinsic to the fMRI
time series was corrected using an AR(1) process.
For each participant, we created a design-matrix with event
onsets time-locked to the temporal positions of: event presenta-
tion; presentation of cue prompting response; motor response;
and presentation of information. These were modeled as dura-
tions of 4, 0, and 2 s, respectively. For all task components (except
for motor responses), regressors were subdivided into two condi-
tions: trials of events for which participants received good news
1http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
and trials of events for which they received bad news, resulting
in seven regressors for each session. These events were convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) to cre-
ate regressors of interest. Motion correction regressors estimated
from the realignment procedure were entered as covariates of no
interest.
To identify regions tracking estimation errors, we entered
absolute estimation errors as parametric regressors modulating
the events in which information was presented. For each con-
dition (that is, for trials in which information was better than
expected and trials in which information was worse) we identi-
ﬁed regions showing signiﬁcant effects across both healthy and
depressed participants (p < 0.05, cluster level corrected across
the whole brain; images ﬁrst thresholded at p < 0.001, uncor-
rected). Owing to the fact that past research (Sharot et al., 2011)
showed that individual differences in our task are best predicted
by region(s) inversely tracking bad news estimation errors, betas
from the peak voxel in the region(s) tracking bad news esti-
mation errors were extracted and compared between depressed
participants and controls using an independent sample t-test
(p < 0.05) in SPSS. Previous research suggests that peak voxel
activity can be a better predictor of electrophysiological mea-
sures of activation than average cluster (Arthurs and Boniface,
2003).
In addition, the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) was an a-
priori ROI because our previous ﬁndings (Sharot et al., 2011)
showed that the degree to which BOLD signals in this region track
bad news estimation errors differentiated between participants
with high and low trait optimism. Thus we examined whether
a similar difference existed between depressed and controls in the
anatomically deﬁned rIFG using small volume correction.
All activations are displayed on sections of the standard
MNI reference brain. Anatomical labels were assigned using the
Talairach Daemon database (University of Texas Health Science
Center San Antonio2) according to peak voxels in Talairach and
Tournoux coordinate space. rIFG was anatomically deﬁned by
creating an ROI mask using WFU Pickatlas3.
RESULTS
UNBIASED UPDATING IN MDD, BUT BIASED UPDATING IN CONTROLS
Our results revealed unbiased updating in depressed individu-
als, but a valance-dependent updating bias in healthy individuals.
Speciﬁcally, a group (MDD/healthy) by valence (good news/bad
news) ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,27) = 9.16,
p < 0.01, Figure 2]. Replicating previous ﬁndings (Sharot
et al., 2011, 2012a,b; Chowdhury et al., 2013; Korn et al., 2013;
Moutsiana et al., 2013),we show that healthy participants updated
their beliefs to a greater extent in response to good news relative
to bad news [t(13) = 5.00, p < 0.001; 93% of healthy partic-
ipants showed greater updating in response to good news]. No
such difference was observed in the MDD group [t(14) = 1.49,
p > 0.15; 60% of depressed participants showed greater updat-
ing in response to good news, see also Korn et al. (2013) for
similar ﬁndings in hospitalized, medicated, depressed patients].
2http://www.talairach.org/
3http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas
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FIGURE 2 | Unbiased updating in MDD, but biased updating in
controls. After receiving good news that presented an opportunity to
adjust beliefs in a positive direction, healthy participants updated their
estimations to a greater extent than after receiving bad news that called for
adjustments in a negative direction. In contrast, depressed participants
updated their beliefs to a similar extent after receiving good and bad news,
and updated their beliefs more than healthy individuals when receiving bad
news. Error bars represent SEM *p < 0.05, two-tailed independent/paired
samples t -test.
The interaction was further characterized by greater updating
in response to bad news [t(27) = 2.96, p < 0.01] in the MDD
group compared to the healthy controls, with no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in updating between groups in response to good news
[t(27) = −0.37, p > 0.70]. Our results suggest that depression, in
contrast to good mental health, is related to a lack of discounting
of bad news, resulting in unbiased updating of beliefs in response
to good and bad news.
DIFFERENTIAL UPDATING IN HEALTH AND DISEASE CANNOT BE
EXPLAINED BY MEMORY, FAMILIARITY, PAST EXPERIENCE WITH THE
AVERSIVE LIFE EVENTS, VIVIDNESS, REPORTED AROUSAL, REPORTED
NEGATIVITY, REACTION TIMES, PRIORS, NUMBER OF TRIALS
To examine whether the relationship between depression and
updating could be explained by any other factor, we tested for a
relationship between depression and all other variables recorded.
Note, that we do not perform corrections for multiple compar-
isons because the aim of these analyses was to identify potential
confounding factors; thus, by not using Bonferroni corrections,
our analyses are more stringent.
Memory
After the scanning session, participants were asked to indicate the
actual probability (as previously presented) of each event occur-
ring on average. Memory errors were calculated as the absolute
difference between the actual probability previously presented
and the participants’ recollection of that statistic. Memory errors
did not differ between groups (see Table 2) and there was no
interaction with valence [F(1,27) = 1.07, p = 0.31].
Life event ratings
Participants rated life events onﬁve scales (past life experiencewith
the events, familiarity with the events, ability to imagine them
vividly, emotional arousal and negativity). The scores revealed
that past experience and familiarity with the adverse life events, as
well as the ability to vividly imagine the events and the subjective
sense of emotional arousal in response to the events, did not dif-
fer between MDD and healthy controls and did not interact with
valence (Table 2). However, hownegative theparticipants rated the
events did reveal a group by valence interaction [F(1,27) = 6.76,
p = 0.02]. MDD patients rated life events that they received bad
Table 2 | Participants’ ratings of familiarity with stimuli, prior experience, vividness, arousal, negativity, memory, initial estimates, reaction
times and number of trials.
MDD mean (SD) CONTROLS mean (SD)
Questionnaire and variables Good news Bad news Good news Bad news
Subjective Scales Questionnaire: all scales 1 = low to 6 = high
Familiarityv 3.88 (0.82) 3.62 (0.84) 4.06 (0.99) 3.67 (0.92)
Prior experiencev 1.65 (0.31) 1.46 (0.24) 1.50 (0.68) 1.39 (0.64)
Vividnessv 3.87 (0.84) 3.52 (0.75) 3.68 (0.89) 3.50 (0.81)
Emotional arousal 3.24 (0.79) 2.95 (0.70) 3.29 (0.85) 3.34 (0.95)
Negativity v∗g 3.97 (0.71) 3.76 (0.61) 3.98 (0.68) 4.09 (0.67)
Task-related variables
Memory errors 11.26 (4.37) 10.39 (3.38) 11.23 (3.29) 11.45 (1.86)
Initial estimatesv 43.25 (7.35) 21.01 (3.2) 44.07 (5.22) 19.84 (4.47)
Reaction time ﬁrst estimate (ms) 2183.01 (663.41) 2153.83 (578.97) 2298.73 (790.90) 2303.33 (716.04)
Reaction time second estimate (ms)v∗g 1762.00 (533.63) 1819.19 (566.46) 1997.20 (648.74) 1891.72 (618.93)
Number of trials 36.53(12.44) 34.67(8.55) 34.64(12.30) 36.71(7.04)
vMain effect valence, p < 0.05.
gMain effect group, p < 0.05 (NB: there was no group difference for any of the variables).
v∗gInteraction effect (group × valence), p < 0.05.
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news for during the experiment as less aversive than events they
received good news for. This was the opposite in the case of healthy
controls who rated life events for which they received bad news as
more aversive than life events for which they received good news.
Thus we repeated the main analysis of update scores while control-
ling for differential scores of negativity (i.e., scores on good news
trials minus scores on bad news trials). After entering these scores
as covariates, the group by valance interaction on update scores
remained signiﬁcant [F(1,26) = 5.10, p< 0.05]. Thus, differential
update could not be explained by differences in the degree of the
perceived negativity of the events, by familiarity or by past experi-
ence with the events, by whether the events were imagined vividly
or experienced as more or less emotionally arousing.
Task factors (number of trials, priors, estimation errors, RTs)
There were no differences across groups in the number of missed
responses, nor the number of goodnews andbadnews trials. These
factors did not differ across valence nor did valence interact with
group (see Table 2 for statistics). Thus, MDD participants did not
miss more responses than controls and were not more likely to
encounter good news trials than bad news trials. The magnitude
of the estimation errors did not differ between groups [bad news:
t(27) = −0.02, p > 0.99, good news t(27) = 0.64, p > 0.53].
Participants’priors – their initial estimates of the probability of the
events – did not differ across groups, however, they did correlate
with BDI scores (r = 0.38; p < 0.05). In other words, the more
depressed the individual, themore likely theywere to estimate their
chances of encountering aversive events as greater (also see Strunk
et al., 2006). Reaction time for ﬁrst estimates did not differ between
groups. However, reaction time for second estimates did reveal
a valence by group interaction [F(1,27) = 6.24, p < 0.05] with
MDD participants slightly faster than controls to re-estimate their
likelihood of encountering an event they previously received good
news for. After entering the difference in second estimate reaction
time as a covariate along with initial estimates and differential
scores of negativity (see above), the group by valance interaction
on update scores remained signiﬁcant [F(1,24) = 5.39, p< 0.05].
Framing
Whether participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of the
events happening in the future, or never happening, did not alter
our results. A group (MDD, healthy) by valence (good news/bad
news) by frame (happen/not happen) ANOVA revealed the
expected two-way interaction of group by valence [F(1,27) = 4.92,
p < 0.04], which is driven by controls updating more on good
news trials than bad and MDD showing unbiased updating. How-
ever, there were no other signiﬁcant interactions with group. Note,
that reaction times did not differ between frames [t(28) = 0.96,
p > 0.34] nor groups [t(28) = 1.09, p > 0.28] nor was there an
interaction between group and frame [F(1,27) = 0.131, p > 0.7].
UNBIASED UPDATING IN MDD EXPLAINED BY ADEQUATE USE AND
NEURAL TRACKING OF NEGATIVE ESTIMATION ERRORS
Learning scores
As depicted in Figures 3B,C, learning scores are calculated by
quantifying the relationship, on a trial-by-trial basis for each par-
ticipant between an estimation error and subsequent update. The
resulting regression coefﬁcient indexes the learning score (note
that this is different from the update score discussed in the pre-
vious section). While participants learned from the information
presented to them [mean regression coefﬁcients relating an indi-
vidual’s estimation errors to update was signiﬁcantly different
from zero; t(28) = 10.79, p< 0.001], their ability to do so was dif-
ferentially related to depression symptoms as a function of valence.
Speciﬁcally, the more depressed the participant, as indicated by
BDI score, the greater the learning score was for bad news, but
learning scores for good news were not reliably associated with
depression (Figure 3A). This was evident in a positive correla-
tion between BDI and learning scores in trials when participants
received bad news (r = 0.36, p = 0.05) and no correlation between
BDI and learning scores when receiving good news (r = −0.09,
p > 0.62). The difference between these two correlations was
statistically signiﬁcant (Z = 2.17, p < 0.05, Steiger’s Z test).
Our ﬁndings suggest a likely computational principle that
mediates the observed unbiased belief formation in depression.
Speciﬁcally, they point to estimation errors as providing a learning
signal whose impact on update depends on an interaction between
depressed mental state and whether this new information calls for
an update in a positive or negative direction.
fMRI data
Given the above results we examined our fMRI data to identify
how BOLD signals track estimation errors in response to infor-
mation that entails a belief adjustment in either a positive or a
negative direction in depressed and healthy individuals. Abso-
lute estimation errors on each trial were entered as a parametric
regressor modulating the time point at which participants were
presented with information regarding the average probability of
events. From this analysis, we ﬁrst identiﬁed regions where BOLD
signal correlated with estimation errors for either good or bad
news on a trial by trial basis across all participants
BOLD signal correlated positively with good news estimation
errors in the left inferior frontal gyrus (left IFG: peak voxel in
Talairach coordinates: –50, 17, –4; k = 293; z = 4.31, Figure 4A)
and bilateral superior frontal gyrus (bilateral SFG: −6, 60, 26;
k = 174; z = 4.01, Figure 4B). In addition BOLD signal cor-
related negatively with bad news estimation errors in the right
inferior parietal lobule (right IPL: 65, −27, 36; k = 185; z = 4.30,
Figure 4C) and positively with bad news errors in Superior Tem-
poral Gyrus (−44, −50, 14; k = 1174; z = 4.92) and Superior
Frontal Gyrus (−2, 50, 31; k = 203; z = 3.80). There were no
voxels in which activity correlated negatively with good news esti-
mation errors. These ﬁve ROIs comprise the entire set of regions
identiﬁed in the current dataset at this threshold (FWE cluster
level corrected after voxel-wise thresholding at p < 0.001)
We then examined whether the extent to which brain activ-
ity tracked estimation errors was related to depression. We were
speciﬁcally interested in the region where BOLD signal was
inversely tracking bad news estimation errors because our past
research (Sharot et al., 2011) showed that this is the pattern of
activity that predicts individual differences. We thus compared
betas (relating BOLD signal to estimation errors) from the peak
voxel in rIPL for participants in theMDDgroup and control group.
Indeed, this revealed that BOLD response in the rIPL of depressed
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 639 | 6
Garrett et al. Unbiased belief updating in depression
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between depression and learning from good
and bad news. (A) Correlation across participants between BDI and learning
scores from good and bad news. (A,B) Learning is deﬁned here as the
relationship between estimation errors and update across trials for each
subject. Data from two participants demonstrate this association for trials in
which the participant received good news and trials in which the participant
received bad news. The slope of each line is the learning score of that
participant. In this example, learning from bad news is worse than learning
from good news in the healthy participant (B) but does not differ as much for
the depressed participant (C). Note that for display purposes we have
reversed the sign of update and estimation errors for bad news trials so that
the plots do not sit on top of each other.
participants tracked bad news errors with greater ﬁdelity than was
the case for healthy controls [t(27) = −2.27, p< 0.05, Figure 4D;
note that betas are negative, which indicate an inverse correlation
– the larger the magnitude of the negative number, the stronger
the relationship between BOLD signal and bad news estimation
errors].
In additionwe tested for differences in the anatomically deﬁned
right IFG, as we have previously found that participants with low
trait optimism were more likely to have a negative correlation
between BOLD signal and bad news estimation errors in this area
in the exact same task (Sharot et al., 2011). Indeed, we observed
here a stronger negative correlation between BOLD activity in the
right Inferior FrontalGyrus (rIFG) and badnews estimation errors
in depressed patients compared to healthy controls [t(27) = 4.52,
p < 0.05 FWE, small volume corrected].
None of the above effects can be explained by the magni-
tude of the estimation errors – as reported above these did not
differ between groups. In other words, rIPL and rIFG representa-
tion of errors in response to bad news differentiated depressed
individuals from healthy controls. For completeness we tested
for differences between groups in the other ROIs identiﬁed –
none were observed. Together, these results suggest that adequate
computational exploitation, and representation of, negative esti-
mation errors in depression underlies a relatively unbiased belief
formation.
DISCUSSION
A substantial body of research now suggests that optimal men-
tal health is associated with unrealistic positive beliefs regarding
the self (Taylor and Armor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2003; McKay and
Dennett, 2010). According to Bandura (1989), for example, if
self-efﬁcacy beliefs were merely to mirror what people could rea-
sonably accomplish, people would seldom fail but neither would
they mount the extra effort required to go beyond ordinary
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FIGURE 4 | Brain activity tracking estimation errors. (A,B) Regions in
which BOLD signal tracked participants’ estimation errors on a trial-by-trial
basis across both groups in response to good news regarding future
likelihoods included the left IFG (A) and bilateral SFG (B) (p < 0.05, FWE
cluster level corrected). (C) BOLD signal tracking participants’ estimation
errors in response to bad news was found in the right IPL (p < 0.05, FWE
cluster level corrected). (D) Parameter estimates of the parametric
regressors from peak voxels in the right IPL showed a stronger inverse
correlation between BOLD activity and bad news errors in depressed
individuals relative to healthy individuals. Error bars represent SEM
*p < 0.05, two-tailed independent samples t -test.
performance. If indeed biased beliefs regarding the self are adap-
tive, there should be a mechanism that promotes formation of
such skewed views, one that could be hypothesized to be unbiased
during maladaptive mental states.
Our results show that clinically depressed participants updated
their beliefs in proportion to the error made whether it called
for updating in a desirable or undesirable direction, consistent
with past results (Korn et al., 2013). In contrast, healthy individu-
als, were less likely to update beliefs when information called for
adjustment in a pessimistic direction. This behavior was medi-
ated by a diminished coding of “bad news” estimation errors
in right IPL in healthy individuals, while depression was asso-
ciated with close coding of negative estimation errors. These
results suggest that adequate computational use, and represen-
tation of, negative estimation errors in depression underlies a
relatively unbiased belief formation. The ﬁnding that mild depres-
sion may be related in some domains to an absence of a positive
bias, rather than a presence of a negative bias also raises an
interesting possibility for future research. Namely, testing whether
the absence of positively biased belief updating could predict
the onset of a depressive episode among individuals at risk for
depression.
Interestingly, across groups activity increased for a better than
expected outcome in regions tracking positive estimation errors,
and dipped for a worse than expected outcome within right IPL.
Depressed individuals were also more likely to show a pattern of
inverse correlation between BOLD signal and bad news estimation
errors in the right IFG than controls. This pattern resembles that of
dopaminergic neurons signaling prediction errors (Schultz, 1997).
Indeed, we have previously shown that increasing dopamine func-
tion (via administration of L-DOPA) enhances an update bias in
healthy individuals by impairing updating from negative infor-
mation even further (Sharot et al., 2012a; see also Frank et al.,
2004). Dopamine neurons are known to project to the regions
identiﬁed here (Fallon and Moore, 1978; Gerfen, 1992; Goldman-
Rakic, 2000), and it is of interest that abnormal functioning of the
dopaminergic system has been related to depression (Papakostas,
2006) and thus may underlie the lack of discounting of negative
news observed in the disease.
Our results were not explained by how well participants sub-
sequently recalled the information presented to them, as memory
for the data provided did not differ across groups. This renders
it unlikely that our results are driven by general differences in
cognitive or mnemonic abilities. Note also that the participants
performed exactly the same task on trials in which they received
good news and on trials in which they received bad news, thus
valence dependent differences cannot be explained by one group
having speciﬁc problems with percentages, generally updating
less/more or any domain general cognitive function. Neither did
our results reﬂect speciﬁc characteristics of events including famil-
iarity with aversive events, how negative the events were perceived
to be, how emotionally arousing participants found the events, nor
their past life experience with the aversive events. In other words,
the depressed participants did not havemore experiencewith these
stressful life events and so this cannot explain our results.
Our ﬁndings suggest that a positive state of mental health is
linked to biased processing and interpretation of information in
a manner that supports positively skewed views of the self, while
depression is associated with a pattern of activity that supports
more unbiased harvesting of information. The data, however, can-
not point to causation. Depression may lead to more unbiased
updating, or neural systems that supports more unbiased updat-
ing of beliefs may generate depression. Furthermore, as depression
progresses, and/or in more severe cases, a negatively biased may be
observed (the majority of patients in our study were moderately,
clinically depressed).
It has been suggested that people create positive life afﬁrm-
ing illusions to enable them to cope with uncertainty and anxiety
regarding future dire events (Becker, 1997;Varki, 2009). These illu-
sions are particularly apparent under aversive circumstances and
promote resilience in such situations (Taylor et al., 1984; Wood
et al., 1985). A system that does not allow the creation of such
perceptions may promote angst and undermine coping strategies
resulting in a downward spiral of the effect of stressful life events
on mental health.
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